Max DuBoff

Research

My research centers on three topics in Epicurean ethics: hedonism, deliberation, and later Epicurean therapy against the fear of death.

Papers forthcoming:

Hedonism: Epicurus endorses hedonism yet considers the absence of pain to be the greatest pleasure. I appeal to Epicurus’s epistemology to explain why he considers the absence of pain to be a pleasure and why he endorses hedonism. I appeal to his conception of a perfect life to explain why the absence of pain determines whether a life is good, and to explain why Epicurus considers a perfect life to be consistent with some pain.

Deliberation: Epicurus’s theory of practical deliberation is standardly but problematically characterized as a “hedonistic calculus.” I challenge this characterization by showing that it does not fit Epicurus’s commitment to a perfect life and does not fit Epicurus’s view that death is nothing to us. In a paper forthcoming in Ancient Philosophy, I propose how an Epicurean may fatally self-sacrifice for a friend. in a paper forthcoming in Apeiron, I argue that an Epicurean may pursue sex under some circumstances, related to both the possible harms in a given situation and to one’s particular desires. This paper on Epicurean sex inspired a paper in progress on how asexuality and how sexual attraction fits into practical deliberation.

Fear of Death: There are lots of reasons we fear death, and types of fear of death. Later Epicureans addressed a wider variety of fears of death than Epicurus did, to make their philosophy more effective for overcoming the fear of death. Sometimes they introduced new problems, though. I identify a fear of death that appears in Lucretius but not Epicurus, and the improper desire that undergirds it. And I argue that Philodemus’s view of “bites” or “pangs,” which he thinks the wise Epicurean may have without having fear, are inconsistent with Epicurus’s views.

I am broadly interested in the Herculaneum papyri, and I am excited that the Vesuvius Challenge is making damaged Herculaneum papyri readable. I have a paper in progress on the argument of the most recently published PHerc. 1667, which discusses Stoicism.

Here are fuller descriptions of just some of my papers forthcoming and in progress:

Hedonism

Although Epicurus was a hedonist, he made two distinctive claims about pleasure: the absence of pain is a pleasure, called katastematic or static pleasure; and katastematic pleasure alone determines whether one lives well. “Epicurean Pleasure: Pathos as a Criterion of Truth and Action” draws on recent work in Epicurean epistemology to explain katastematic pleasure. I argue that, for Epicurus, what it is for something to be a pleasure is for it to serve a certain epistemological function, which I show is the case for the absence of pain. This interpretation of pleasure explains how we recognize the absence of pain as good and, accordingly, why we ought to pursue it.

Why does Epicurus endorse hedonism, given that he thinks the absence of pain makes a life good? “Perfection and Pleasure: Why Epicurus Was a Hedonist” addresses this understudied question. I argue that Epicurus endorsed hedonism because only evident [enargēs] impressions can provide knowledge of the good, and only pleasure is evident in this sense. But this epistemological rationale for hedonism does not settle what constitutes a good life. Epicurus also claimed that a good life must be a perfect life, i.e., one which cannot be improved with respect to its goodness. His hedonism, with all its tensions, attempts to make sense of these two commitments—to the evidentness of the good and to the importance of a perfect life.

Deliberation

On the standard interpretation, Epicurus recommends using a “hedonistic calculus” to determine which actions produce more pleasure than pain and should be pursued. “Epicurean Deliberation: Beyond a Hedonistic Calculus” argues that we must revise this picture in light of Epicurus’s commitment to a perfect life. On my model, an Epicurean does not simply weigh up all the pleasures and pains of different possibilities to determine which is the largest and thereby decide what to do. Rather, deliberation is a two-stage process. First, determine whether an action promotes the stable absence of pain. If it promotes it, pursue that action; and if it impedes it, avoid that action. Second, only if the action is neutral with respect to the blessed life of reliable freedom from pain, pursue what provides the most pleasant stimulation.

Epicurus advocates direct egoism, according to most interpreters, whereby each action should be referred to one’s own tranquility; yet he considers friendship essential for tranquility, and we are told that an Epicurean will die for a friend. To reconcile these claims, “Death of an Egoist: An Epicurean Approach to Fatal Self-Sacrifice” (forthcoming at Ancient Philosophy) develops an Epicurean justification for fatal self-sacrifice. Because Epicurus claims that being dead has no value, an Epicurean cannot employ a standard justification for self-sacrifice—that it is better than living on. However, I argue that an Epicurean can accept death as the remaining deliberative option if all other options would prevent tranquility. This account explains Epicurean suicide and may be accepted by some current-day non-Epicureans. This paper is currently under review.

Epicureans issue grave warnings about the harms caused by sex, but we have ample evidence that Epicureans married and had children, which indicates that they did not forbid sex. “Epicurean Sex” argues that there is no inconsistency here: a wise Epicurean may, on some occasions, pursue sex, despite its risks. I argue for an interpretation of Vatican Sayings 51 which takes seriously the dangers of sex but does not prohibit it to wise Epicureans. Then I propose conditions under which a wise Epicurean may pursue sex, related to natural variation in sexual desire and to the advantages of Epicurean friendship.

Fear of Death

According to Epicureans, the fear of death is one of the primary barriers to living well. But what causes the fear of death, and how can we combat it? “Reasons-Responsiveness and Fear of Death: Epicurus vs. Lucretius” identifies a disagreement on this question. Epicurus attributes the fear of death to a false belief about nature or value theory. Lucretius, however, acknowledges a fear of death that stems from a mismatch between one’s expectations of how the world should be and how the world actually is (DRN 3.952-971). Lucretius combats this fear by arguing for the inappropriateness of these expectations about how the world should be. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 2024 Pacific APA.