My research centers on three topics in Epicurean ethics: hedonism, deliberation, and applied ethics.

Hedonism: Epicurus endorses hedonism yet considers the absence of pain to be the greatest pleasure. I appeal to Epicurus’s epistemology to explain why he considers the absence of pain to be a pleasure and why he endorses hedonism. I appeal to his conception of a perfect life to explain why the absence of pain determines whether a life is good, and to explain why Epicurus considers a perfect life to be consistent with some pain.

Deliberation: Epicurus’s theory of practical deliberation is standardly but problematically characterized as a “hedonistic calculus.” I challenge this characterization by showing that it does not fit Epicurus’s commitment to a perfect life and does not fit Epicurus’s view that death is nothing to us. I also propose how an Epicurean may fatally self-sacrifice for a friend.

Applied ethics and desire management: Epicurean applied ethics relies on their views about desires. I identify a fear of death that appears in Lucretius but not Epicurus, and the improper desire that undergirds it. And I argue that an Epicurean may pursue sex under some circumstances, related to both the possible harms in a given situation and to one’s particular desires. This paper on Epicurean sex inspired a paper on the current-day philosophy of asexuality.

I am also interested in disagreements between early and later Epicureanism, and I intend a substantial project on Philodemus in the future, especially as the Vesuvius Challenge is poised to make damaged Herculaneum papyri readable.

Here are fuller descriptions of my papers in progress:

Hedonism

Although Epicurus was a hedonist, he made two distinctive claims about pleasure: the absence of pain is a pleasure, called katastematic or static pleasure; and katastematic pleasure alone determines whether one lives well. “Epicurean Pleasure: Pathos as a Criterion of Truth and Action” draws on recent work in Epicurean epistemology to explain katastematic pleasure. I argue that, for Epicurus, what it is for something to be a pleasure is for it to serve a certain epistemological function, which I show is the case for the absence of pain. This interpretation of pleasure explains how we recognize the absence of pain as good and, accordingly, why we ought to pursue it.

Why does Epicurus endorse hedonism, given that he thinks the absence of pain makes a life good? “Perfection and Pleasure: Why Epicurus Was a Hedonist” addresses this understudied question. I argue that Epicurus endorsed hedonism because only evident [enargēs] impressions can provide knowledge of the good, and only pleasure is evident in this sense. But this epistemological rationale for hedonism does not settle what constitutes a good life. Epicurus also claimed that a good life must be a perfect life, i.e., one which cannot be improved with respect to its goodness. His hedonism, with all its tensions, attempts to make sense of these two commitments—to the evidentness of the good and to the importance of a perfect life.

Since pain is often unavoidable, hedonism might seem to rule out the possibility of a perfect life. “Antiparatattesthai: Why Some Pain Is Consistent with a Perfect Epicurean Life” develops a new account of this tension. The wise can use the recollection and anticipation of pleasure, Epicurus thinks, to preserve a perfect life amidst pain. I argue that, for Epicurus, there is an experience of painless bodily functioning which some pains necessarily impede and others do not. Accordingly, recollection and anticipation allow one to experience painlessness in a relevant way even though some pain remains. An Epicurean has no reason to stop living as long as they have the experience of painlessness. This paper has been accepted for presentation at the 2026 Central APA.

Deliberation

On the standard interpretation, Epicurus recommends using a “hedonistic calculus” to determine which actions produce more pleasure than pain and should be pursued. “Epicurean Deliberation: Beyond a Hedonistic Calculus” argues that we must revise this picture in light of Epicurus’s commitment to a perfect life. To determine how to act, Epicurus does not compare pleasures only insofar as they are pleasures; rather, what one should pursue depends on what will lead to a perfect life. Thus, the standard for choice is not simply the goodness (i.e., pleasure) of the objects of choice. One must instead refer all of one’s decisions to living a perfect life. Because many pleasures impede a perfect life, there are many goods which one has pro tanto reason to pursue but which are not all-things-considered choiceworthy.

Epicurus advocates direct egoism, according to most interpreters, whereby each action should be referred to one’s own tranquility; yet he considers friendship essential for tranquility, and we are told that an Epicurean will die for a friend. To reconcile these claims, “Death of an Egoist: An Epicurean Approach to Fatal Self-Sacrifice” develops an Epicurean justification for fatal self-sacrifice. Because Epicurus claims that being dead has no value, an Epicurean cannot employ a standard justification for self-sacrifice—that it is better than living on. However, I argue that an Epicurean can accept death as the remaining deliberative option if all other options would prevent tranquility. This account explains Epicurean suicide and may be accepted by some current-day non-Epicureans. This paper is currently under review.

Applied Ethics: Managing Desires

According to Epicureans, the fear of death is one of the primary barriers to living well. But what causes the fear of death, and how can we combat it? “Reasons-Responsiveness and Fear of Death: Epicurus vs. Lucretius” identifies a disagreement on this question. Epicurus attributes the fear of death to a false belief about nature or value theory. Lucretius, however, acknowledges a fear of death that stems from a mismatch between one’s expectations of how the world should be and how the world actually is (DRN 3.952-971). Lucretius combats this fear by arguing for the inappropriateness of these expectations about how the world should be. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 2024 Pacific APA.

Epicureans issue grave warnings about the harms caused by sex, but we have ample evidence that Epicureans married and had children, which indicates that they did not forbid sex. “Epicurean Sex” argues that there is no inconsistency here: a wise Epicurean may, on some occasions, pursue sex, despite its risks. I argue for an interpretation of Vatican Sayings 51 which takes seriously the dangers of sex but does not prohibit it to wise Epicureans. Then I propose conditions under which a wise Epicurean may pursue sex, related to natural variation in sexual desire and to the advantages of Epicurean friendship. This paper is currently under review, and I presented it at the 2025 Eastern APA.

My work on Epicurean sex prompted me to consider a puzzle in the current-day philosophy of asexuality (the A in LGBTQIA). An important claim by asexual thinkers is that sexual attraction and sexual desire can come apart: asexuals do not experience the former, but some may experience the latter. “Sexual Attraction” attempts to explain and motivate this claim in two ways. First, I propose that sexual attraction provides a distinct normative reason for sex; asexuals do not have this reason for sex but may have others. Second, I argue that distinguishing sexual attraction from sexual desire allows progress on two problems in philosophy of sex, sexual racism and bad sex. Sexual desire, unlike sexual attraction, allows political and prudential concerns to play a significant role in one’s reasons for and against sex. I began to consider some of these issues in a post for the Blog of the APA, “Asexuality and Epicureanism.”